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Showing posts with label Middle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Middle. Show all posts

Thursday, February 17, 2011

How Europe Can Help the Revolutions in the Middle East Succeed (Time.com)

All revolutions have their own distinct trajectories, and any attempt to locate what is happening in the Middle East within the framework of what has gone before will get us only so far.

Still, history has some useful lessons. The first is, when revolutions happen, tolerate messiness. No revolution moves neatly from the streets to a peaceful, stable, new dispensation. The American Revolution didn't sort itself out until 1787 - in truth, not really until 1865. France went from the high-mindedness of 1789 to the Reign of Terror and then Bonapartism. After 1989, Russia's second revolution rapidly devolved from market liberalism to crony capitalism and then to legitimated authoritarianism. Along the way, sympathizers outside the revolutionary space lose heart. William Wordsworth rushed to France ("Bliss was it that dawn to be alive") but later deplored the militaristic turn of the revolution and ended up a grumbling rural conservative. (See pictures of protests spreading across the Middle East.)

Everyone needs to be patient. In the Middle East, we are dealing with something novel. We knew how to think about the old power structures of the Middle East, oscillating between polarities of autocracy and Islamism. But now we are having to come to terms with a new source of strength: young people linked by technology to one another and to the outside world, whose frustrations and demands are principally economic in nature, not religious, anticolonialist or nationalist (at least, not in the sense of wanting to go out and fight someone else). Though we can't know how this new power source will organize itself - or, indeed, who will try to co-opt it - the economic nature of its grievances should give one heart. If this were an old-fashioned nationalist revolt, the risk that it would soon be in conflict with the interests of other nations would be much greater. But economic reform can be introduced (or sped up) in the Middle East without the process's destabilizing relations with others.

Second, remember that while leadership matters, institutions matter more. Some of the most successful transformations to democracy in modern times - Spain, Indonesia - have not had an obvious, charismatic leader. But all successful revolutions have institutional structures that enable radical habits to mature. Sometimes these will be political parties - like the ANC in South Africa or the historical socialist parties in Spain and Portugal. Sometimes they will be organized but informal groups, like the supporters of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. Sometimes a religious group does the trick, as the church did in Poland. It's when there is no institutional structure that revolutions go wrong or are co-opted by narrow groups for their own interest, as happened in Russia after 1989. In Egypt, the obviously strong institutions now are the army and the Muslim Brotherhood. They are making all the right noises, but they have their own agendas to pursue and interests to defend. Meanwhile, the new energy of the young is less organized, or at least less organized in a way that makes it easy for it to assume state power. (See TIME's complete coverage of Egypt.)

Third, if they are to succeed and contribute to regional and global stability, revolutionary states need to be welcomed into international clubs. In the European transformations from autocracy in the 1970s and 1990s, it's striking how important the promise of membership in the E.U. and NATO turned out to be. When there isn't such an offer from the outside, things can go wrong. There's a convincing narrative that argues that the great mistake the West made in the 1990s was shutting Russia out from international institutional arrangements.

So it's worth asking: What such offer can be made to the postrevolutionary states of the Middle East? Europe has a special responsibility here. The E.U. is the Arab Middle East's close neighbor and natural market. (In 2009, Egypt's trade with the E.U. was more than three times as valuable as that with the U.S.) If you're Tunisian, Algerian or Moroccan, you want to emigrate to Paris, not Pittsburgh. These are soccer societies, not baseball ones. (See the top 10 famous protest plazas.)

True, Europe has found it awfully hard to make a grand gesture to its Muslim neighbors. It has vacillated on E.U. membership for Turkey. And it's closing its doors to immigrants. But three years ago, French President Nicolas Sarkozy made much of the benefits that would come from a Mediterranean community that linked north and south. Like many of his ideas, it was a bit grandiose, and it has so far got little traction within the rest of the E.U. That doesn't mean it was wrong.

Read "Songs of the Revolution: A Bahrain Website Mixes Music and Activism."

See pictures of Tunisia's tumultuous month.

View this article on Time.com

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View the original article here

Why There's No Turning Back in the Middle East (Time.com)

The year of the revolutions began in January, in a small country of little importance. Then the protests spread to the region's largest and most important state, toppling a regime that had seemed firmly entrenched. The effect was far-reaching. The air was filled with talk of liberty and freedom. Street protests cropped up everywhere, challenging the rule of autocrats and monarchs, who watched from their palaces with fear.

That could be a description of events in Tunisia and Egypt as those countries' peaceful revolutions have inspired and galvanized people across the Middle East. In fact, it refers to popular uprisings 162 years earlier that began in Sicily and France. The revolutions of 1848, as they were called, were remarkably similar in mood to what is happening right now in the Middle East. (They were dubbed the springtime of peoples by historians at the time.) The backdrop then, as now, was a recession and rising food prices. The monarchies were old and sclerotic. The young were in the forefront. New information technologies - mass newspapers! - connected the crowds. (See pictures of protests spreading across the Middle East.)

Except that the story didn't end so well. The protesters gained power but then splintered, fought one another and weakened themselves. The military stayed loyal to the old order and cracked down on protests. The monarchs waited things out, and within a few years, the old regimes had reconstituted themselves. "History reached its turning point, and failed to turn," wrote the British historian A.J.P. Taylor.

Will history fail to turn in the Middle East? Will these protests in Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan and beyond peter out, and in a few years, will we look back at 2011 and realize that very little actually changed? It's certainly possible, but there are two fundamental reasons the tensions that have been let loose in the Middle East over the past few weeks are unlikely to disappear, and they encompass two of the most powerful forces changing the world today: youth and technology. (See TIME's special report "The Middle East in Revolt.")

The central, underlying feature of the Middle East's crisis is a massive youth bulge. About 60% of the region's population is under 30. These millions of young people have aspirations that need to be fulfilled, and the regimes in place right now show little ability to do so. The protesters' demands have been dismissed by the regimes as being for Islamic fundamentalism or a product of Western interference. But plainly these are homegrown protests that have often made the West uneasy as they have shaken up old alliances. And what the protesters want in the first place is to be treated as citizens, not subjects. In a recent survey of Middle Eastern youth, the No. 1 wish of the young in nine countries was to live in a free country, although, to be sure, jobs and the desire to live in well-run, modern societies ranked very high as well.

Young people are not always a source of violence. The West experienced a demographic bulge - the famous baby boom in the decades after World War II - that is known mainly for fueling economic growth. China and India, likewise, have a large cohort of young workers, and that adds to those countries' economic strength. But without economic growth, job opportunities and a sense of dignity, too many young people - especially young men - can make for mass discontent. That is what has happened in the Middle East, where the scale of the youth bulge is extreme - perhaps the largest in the world right now. From 1970 to 2007, 80% of all outbreaks of conflict occurred in countries where 60% or more of the population was younger than 30. And even places where the baby boom produced growth are not without problems. The peak years of the West's bulge came in the late 1960s, a period associated with youth rebellions and mass protests. (See the top 10 famous protest plazas.)

Journalists, politicians and scholars have all noted the Middle East's youth problem. But the region's governments have done little to address it - youth unemployment remains staggeringly high, by some measures close to 25%. The oil boom has certainly helped the Gulf countries pay off their people in various ways, but more than half of those who live in the Middle East are in lands that do not produce oil. Moreover, oil has proved a curse in the rich countries, where the economies have little to offer other than extracting hydrocarbons, where armies of foreigners do all the work and where regimes continue to offer their people a basic bargain: we will subsidize you as long as you accept our rule. Rattled by recent developments, Kuwait and Bahrain both decided to give all of their citizens bonuses this year ($3,000 in Kuwait, $2,700 in Bahrain).

Those payments are a reminder that in the Middle East, there are two modes of control: mass repression and mass bribery. Perhaps the latter, used in the Gulf states, will prove more effective - though in Bahrain, the regime faces specific challenges, with a Sunni minority ruling over a Shi'ite majority. The broader predicament facing both systems, however, is a population that is increasingly aware, informed and connected. It's too simple to say that what happened in Tunisia and Egypt happened because of Facebook. But technology - satellite television, computers, mobile phones and the Internet - has played a powerful role in informing, educating and connecting people in the region. Such advances empower individuals and disempower the state. In the old days, information technology favored those in power, because it was one to many. That's why revolutionaries tried to take over radio stations in the 1930s - so they could broadcast information to the masses. Today's technologies are all many to many, networks in which everyone is connected but no one is in control. That's bad for anyone trying to suppress information. (Comment on this story.)

Of course, the state can fight back. The Egyptian government managed to shut down Egyptians' access to the Internet for five days. The Iranian regime closed down cell-phone service at the height of the green movement's protests in 2009. But think of the costs of such moves. Can banks run when the Internet is down? Can commerce expand when cell phones are demobilized? Syria has only now opened access to Facebook, but its basic approach remains to keep the world tightly at bay - which is a major obstacle to economic growth and to tackling that vital problem of youth unemployment. North Korea can stay stable as long as it stays utterly stagnant. (And that stability is for the short term anyway.) For regimes that need or want to respond to the aspirations of their people, openness becomes an economic and political necessity.

The modernizing imperative - societies need to embrace more openness to make progress - is why I am allowing myself to be optimistic about the progress of the youth revolutions. It's easy to be disappointed when looking at the Middle East's sad recent history. And yet something in the region feels as if it is changing. Warren Buffett once said that when anyone tells him, "This time it's different," he reaches for his wallet because he fears he's going to be swindled. Well, I have a feeling that this time in the Middle East, it's different. But I have my hand on my wallet anyway.

See "Songs of the Revolution: A Bahrain Website Mixes Music and Activism."

See pictures of Tunisia's tumultuous month.

View this article on Time.com

Most Popular on Time.com:


View the original article here